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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
   
 
No. 10-1481  
   
 
KAY PARK, 
 
                                  Appellant. 
 
v. 
 
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
 (D. C. No. 2-07-cv-03195) 
District Judge:  Honorable Katharine S. Hayden 
      
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1  
on January 28, 2011 
 
Before:  FUENTES, CHAGARES and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 30, 2011) 
   
 
O P I N I O N 
    
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 Appellant Kay Park is the primary beneficiary of a $1,000,000 whole life 
insurance policy acquired by and in the name of James Park (Mr. Park), her former 
husband, who died on October 5, 2006, of lymphoma.  She sued the insurer, Metropolitan 
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Life Insurance Company (MetLife), after it refused to pay on the policy following her 
husband’s death because of his alleged misrepresentations when purchasing the insurance 
policy.  Park appeals the order of the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey granting MetLife’s Motion for Summary Judgment.  For the reasons that follow, 
we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
I.  Background and Procedural History 
 Although born in Korea, Mr. Park was an American citizen who passed a 
citizenship test conducted in English, ran several successful businesses, and lived in the 
United States for approximately thirty years prior to applying for the contested insurance 
policy.  Mr. Park considered himself a fluent English speaker.  On multiple occasions, 
Mr. Park stated that he understood both Korean and English and did not need a Korean-
to-English translator.   
In November 2004, Mr. Park obtained life insurance in English from MetLife.  
Mr. Kwak, a MetLife agent who speaks Korean, presented the insurance application to 
Mr. Park on or about November 11, 2004.  Kwak sat next to Mr. Park, requested that Mr. 
Park read each question, asked whether Mr. Park understood the question, and recorded 
Mr. Park’s responses.  Although Mr. Park provided numerous answers to health-related 
questions, his answers to a few questions inform our conclusions.  First, when asked 
whether he had “ever used tobacco products,” Mr. Park answered, “No.”  Second, when 
asked whether he had “EVER” received treatment for, or ever been diagnosed with, high 
blood pressure, chest pains, heart attack or any other heart disease, Mr. Park answered, 
“No.”  Third, when asked whether he had, in the past six months, taken any medication or 
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been under observation or treatment, Mr. Park answered, “No.”  Finally, when asked 
whether any sibling or parent “ever had heart disease, coronary artery disease, high blood 
pressure, cancer, diabetes, or mental illness,”  Mr. Park answered, “No.”  At the 
conclusion of the application, Mr. Park provided his signature to confirm that he 
completed the application to “the best of [his] knowledge and belief,” that “all statements 
are true and complete,” and acknowledging that his statements formed “the basis of any 
policy issued.” 
On November 24, 2004, Dong Soon Yi, a fluent English and Korean speaker, 
administered the Paramedical Exam portion of the application to Mr. Park.  Yi conducted 
the entire examination in Korean.  Although Mr. Park provided numerous answers to 
health-related questions presented in the Paramedical Exam portion of the application, his 
answers to a few questions inform our conclusions.  First, when asked to indicate the date 
he last smoked, Mr. Park answered, “5/2003.”  Second, when asked whether he had 
“EVER” received treatment for, or ever been diagnosed with, high blood pressure, chest 
pains, heart attack or any other heart disease, Mr. Park answered, “No.”  Additionally, 
when asked whether any sibling or parent “ever had heart disease, coronary artery 
disease, high blood pressure, cancer, diabetes, or mental illness,”  Mr. Park answered, 
“No.”  At the conclusion of the Paramedical Exam, Mr. Park provided his signature to 
confirm that the answers were “correctly written, as given by [him], and are true and 
complete to the best of [his] knowledge and belief.”  Not only did Mr. Park attest to the 
accuracy and completeness of his answers, but the policy itself contains a 10-day “free 
look” provision allowing him to review the application for accuracy and return the policy 
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prior to its operative date of commencement.  Mr. Park did not return the policy and it 
became effective on November 15, 2004.   
Mr. Park died 23 months later on October 5, 2006.  A month later, Kay Park 
submitted a claim for benefits under the policy.  The policy sets forth a contestability 
period of 24 months, which permits MetLife to conduct inquiries into the veracity of 
answers provided in the application.1
In response to Park’s claim, MetLife had a claims examiner, a medical 
underwriter, and a lay underwriter review the information and medical records obtained 
during the claims process.  Each reviewer opined that Mr. Park’s true medical history 
would have affected the issuance of the policy or the policy’s premiums.  MetLife 
  MetLife’s inquiry revealed that several of Mr. 
Park’s statements in his insurance application and subsequent Paramedical Exam were 
untrue.  The record demonstrates that (1) only one month prior to the application, on or 
about October 14, 2004, Mr. Park had a chest x-ray performed in Englewood Hospital’s 
emergency room and was diagnosed with pneumonia; (2) on or about October 14, 2004, 
Mr. Park was taking antibiotics prescribed by a physician; (3) Mr. Park smoked between 
one and one-and-a-half packs of cigarettes per day for 25 years, until approximately 
December 2005, (4) Mr. Park made four complaints between April 1999 and June 2004 
regarding chest pain, sharpness, chest tightening and palpitations to his physician and 
EKGs were performed; and (5) Mr. Park’s father was diagnosed with stomach cancer and 
his sister was diagnosed with uterine cancer.   
                                                 
1 The policy provides, in relevant part, that “[MetLife] will not contest the validity 
of [a] policy in force during the insured’s lifetime 2 years from the date of the Policy.”   
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informed appellant by letter dated April 30, 2007, that because of Mr. Park’s 
misrepresentations and their effect on the underwriting of the policy, MetLife was 
denying liability on the policy.  Park filed her complaint in the District of New Jersey on 
July 11, 2007 seeking to enforce payment on the insurance policy.  MetLife answered 
Park’s complaint on October 17, 2007, and counterclaimed seeking a declaration that the 
policy was rendered void and rescinded by Mr. Park’s material misrepresentations.  After 
discovery, the District Court granted summary judgment for MetLife.  Park appealed.  
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291.   
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s order granting summary 
judgment and apply the same standard that the district court should have applied.  Farrell 
v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000).  Summary judgment is 
appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any 
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 585 F.3d 
765, 770 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).  This determination is made by 
viewing the “facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw[ing] all 
inferences in that party’s favor.”  Farrell, 206 F.3d at 278.   
III.  Discussion 
 New Jersey law imposes a duty of “utmost good faith” upon insurance applicants, 
Gallagher v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 114 A.2d 857, 861 (N.J. 1955), because 
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insurers must rely on “the truthfulness of the insured’s rendition of his medical history,” 
Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y v. New Horizons, Inc., 146 A.2d 466, 469 (N.J. 1958).  
“An insurer is entitled to relief when it relies on incorrect information provided by an 
insured in an insurance application if the information was material either to the insurer’s 
decision to insure or to the terms of the contract.”  Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Manzo, 584 A.2d 190, 197 (N.J. 1991).  Thus, “an insurer may rescind a policy if the 
insured knowingly misrepresented facts that would have affected the estimate of the risk 
and the premium charged.”  Id. at 193.   
Park contends that the District Court failed to construe the evidence in the light 
most favorable to her, the nonmoving party, regarding whether Mr. Park’s statements 
were not made in good faith or were knowingly false when made.  The record 
demonstrates that Mr. Park made material misrepresentations in his insurance application.  
In an effort to deflect attention from Mr. Park’s admittedly false statements, Park contests 
that the “‘false answers’ Mr. Park was blamed for were induced and created by 
defendant’s own insurance agent, Kwak.”  This claim is belied by Mr. Park’s own 
assertions that he spoke English, his attestation that his application answers regarding his 
history of health were truthful and complete, and the inconsistency between the answers 
given to Kwak and those given to Yi, who interviewed Mr. Park in Korean.   
We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that no reasonable juror could 
conclude from the record that Mr. Park’s answers were accurate or immaterial 
representations.  We also agree with the District Court’s conclusion that no reasonable 
juror could conclude that Mr. Park’s answers were induced or created by Kwak.  Nor 
7 
 
could a reasonable juror could conclude that Mr. Park did not knowingly misrepresent his 
medical history.  Therefore, it was proper for the District Court to grant MetLife’s 
summary judgment motion and enter judgment in MetLife’s favor on its counterclaim for 
rescission. 
IV.  Conclusion 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
